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We propose a new cryptographic protocol. It is suggested to encode information in ordinary
binary form into many-qubit entangled states with the help of a quantum computer. A state of qubits
(realized, e.g., with photons) is transmitted through a quantum channel to the addressee, who applies
a quantum computer tuned to realize the inverse unitary transformation decoding of the message.
Different ways of eavesdropping are considered, and an estimate of the time needed for determining
the secret unitary transformation is given. It is shown that using even small quantum computers can
serve as a basis for very efficient cryptographic protocols. For a suggested cryptographic protocol,
the time scale on which communication can be considered secure is exponential in the number of
qubits in the entangled states and in the number of gates used to construct the quantum network.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982 Feynman suggested that simulation of a quan-
tum system using another such system could be more
effective than using classical computers, which demand
exponential time depending on the size of the sys-
tem [1]. Later discussions focused on the possibility of
using quantum-mechanical systems for solution of clas-
sical problems. For example, Deutsch’s algorithm [2] of
verification of a balanced function was the first quantum
algorithm that worked more efficiently than the classical
analog.
The most famous of these, Shor’s quantum factorizing
algorithm [3], is capable of destroying widespread cryp-
tographic system RSA [4]. That fact made a strong im-
pression and speeded up the development of quantum
cryptography [5] and quantum information processing in
general.
It is important to note that quantum mechanics de-
stroying classical ways of coding still gives the possibility
of constructing new ones. At present, there exist many
ways of coding that use the quantum mechanics.
As an example, the quantum algorithm of key distri-
bution using orthogonal states should be mentioned [6].
It was first experimentally realized by Bennet and Bras-
sard [7], who were able to carry out the transmission only
at a distance of forty centimeters. Later, a communica-
tion line of several kilometers was realized [8].
Another example was first experimentally demon-
strated in 1992 [9]. The method uses pairs of entangled
photons, part of which, with the help of Bell inequalities
of a special form [10], can be used to reveal attempted
eavesdropping.
In the present article, another method of coding is pro-
posed. It uses quantum computers for creating entangled
states of several qubits. The safety of that method is
based on the complexity of tomography for those states.
Later, it will be convenient to treat a single qubit as
a spin- 1
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particle. To transmit information, Alice (the
sender) first transfers it into a set of units and zeros and
divides the numerals into groups of K bits. Then, for
every group, she creates a set of K spins in pure states.
The spin corresponding to a numeral gets the projection
along the fixed Z-axis if the numeral is zero and projected
opposite to the axis otherwise. After that, Alice em-
ploys a preset unitary transformation Uˆ for every group
of K spins, thus obtaining a set of entangled quantum-
mechanical states that hereafter will be called messages:
|Ψk〉 = Uˆ |k〉, (1)
where |k〉 is an unentangled state of spins with certain
projections along the Z-axis, and where the projections
are defined by the sequence of units and zeros for the
binary record of the number k.
Having received K entangled spins, Bob (the receiver)
employs the inverse unitary transformation Uˆ−1, thus
obtaining the original separable state of spins with de-
fined projections, which can be measured and ,thereby,
the secret message can be decoded.
It is natural that only Alice and Bob know the uni-
tary transformation Uˆ , providing that Eve (eavesdrop-
per), trying to measure the entangled quantum states,
will obtain probabilistic results defined by the quantum
mechanics.
Further, we will consider the ways of learning how
to decode the transmitted information and, very impor-
tantly, how much time it takes. We will consider two
different ways: quantum tomography of every entangled
state and a simple guess of the quantum gate network.
The obtained results allow an estimate to be made of how
long Alice and Bob may safely use the unitary transfor-
mation without changing it.
II. QUANTUM TOMOGRAPHY OF AN
ENTANGLED STATE.
In the simplest case, Eve can determine the secret uni-
tary transformation if she knows exactly what informa-
tion is sent by Alice. We will not consider the question
of how she can do that; we will just assume that, having
2intercepted the message, Eve knows exactly what infor-
mation is encoded by Alice. Thus, for simplicity, in this
section we deal with many identical entangled states.
The strategy for Eve is to employ quantum tomog-
raphy for many identical intercepted entangled states.
In [11] it was shown that the density matrix of state
of certain spins can be derived without using quantum
computers. The idea of the method is based on a mea-
surement of the probability p(~n1,m1; ...;~nK ,mK) for ev-
ery spin sˆi projected into the state mi along the direction
~ni. The density matrix is determined by the Monte-Carlo
integration
ρˆcalc =
1
2∑
{mi}=−
1
2
∫
...
∫
d~n1...d~nK
(4π)K
p(~n1,m1; ...;~nK ,mK)
KˆS1(~n1,m1)...KˆSK (~nK ,mK), (2)
where the kernel KˆSi(~ni,mi) acts in the space of i-th
spin.
Let us introduce distance in space of density matrices
|ρˆ1, ρˆ2| =
√∑
i,j
|ρˆ1 − ρˆ2|2ij , |ρˆ| =
√∑
i,j
|ρˆ|2ij . (3)
It is known that, in the Monte-Carlo method, the rel-
ative precision of integration converges as the inverse
square of the number of points used [12]. In our case
we have
α =
|ρˆcalc − ρˆtrue|
|ρˆtrue| ≈
1√
N
, (4)
where N is the number of different sets of directions used
for measurement of spins.
Now we note that, for every set of fixed directions and
for every spin, it is necessary to measure all probabilities
for every combination of indices {mi}. This takes about
Const ∗ 2K intercepted messages.
Thus, we obtain that, in order to derive each density
matrix with precision α it is necessary to intercept
Nintercepted ≈ Const ∗ α−2 ∗ 2K (5)
messages.
To compose the desired unitary transformation, Eve
have to derive the density matrices {ρk} for all 2K en-
tangled states. Every density matrix {ρk} has a single
eigenvalue, 1, and an eigenvector |Ψk〉
ρˆk = |Ψk〉〈Ψk|. (6)
Eve should find eigenvectors of the 2K density matrices
for all entangled states and put them together; thus, she
will get the matrix 2K×2K for the unitary transformation
Uˆ in the basis composed of vectors |k〉. Since the prob-
lem of finding eigen vector for a matrix takes about 22K
elementary operations, the whole problem takes about
Noperations = 2
3K (7)
operations, provided that we have a classical computer
that can operate with
Ndata = 2
2K (8)
complex numbers.
On top of this, for practical applications, Eve must
construct a quantum network by the unitary transfor-
mation. As we will see in the next section, the number
of necessary basic gates is
Ngates ≈ 22K . (9)
Therefore, as Alice and Bob increase the number of bits
contained in a single message, the number of necessary
intercepted messages, the time necessary for deriving the
unitary transformation and the complexity of the con-
structed quantum network grow exponentially.
III. GUESSING OF THE UNITARY
TRANSFORMATION
Complicated unitary transformations can be con-
structed using simple ones which mix states of one or
two qubits. Examples of actively studied gates for quan-
tum networks are based on superconducting circuits [13],
resonant cavities [14], linear ion traps [15] and nuclear
magnetic resonance [16].
The operation of a quantum computer can be pre-
sented as a network of sequential simple unitary trans-
formations. The whole unitary transformation has the
form
Uˆ = UˆM UˆM−1...Uˆ2Uˆ1. (10)
Ekert and Jozsa showed [17] that any unitary trans-
formation of qubits can be represented as a network of
every possible single-qubit gate and one type of double-
qubit gate. An example of double-qubit gate may can be
”controlled NOT” , which acts like |a, b〉 → |a, a⊕ b〉.
Due to the fact that every gate has its counterpart,
which carries out the inverse transformation, we can sim-
ply construct the inverse transformation:
Uˆ−1 = Uˆ−1
1
Uˆ−1
2
...Uˆ−1M−1Uˆ
−1
M .. (11)
Although the method of constructing of the quantum
network by the matrix of the unitary transformation was
presented in [17], in general case the algorithm requires
a polynomial number of gates over the dimension of the
matrix Uˆ−1, thus, in our case, it takes a number of gates
that is exponential in the number of qubits. Neverthe-
less, Alice and Bob do not need to construct a quantum
network to get a certain unitary transformation: instead,
they can just agree on a particular one.
We assume that Alice and Bob possess identical quan-
tum computers which can carry out any of L different
simple unitary transformations, provided that there ex-
ists an inverse transformation for every one in the set. If
3Alice and Bob use the simple transformations M times,
then the number of possible quantum networks is
Nquant(L,M) = L
M . (12)
Eve has no chance to guess the correct unitary trans-
formation trying every quantum network, taking into ac-
count that M and L should be greater than the square
number of qubits K2, because Alice and Bob, a least,
need to mix every qubit with each over.
As one can see, dependance (12) is again exponential.
This formula yet does not take into account the fact that,
for every trial network, Eve must do several measure-
ments of quantum states to realize whether the network
she has guessed is correct or not. Let
p = |〈k|Uˆ−1guessUˆ |k〉|2 (13)
be the probability of erroneous acceptance of a trial uni-
tary transformation Uˆguess instead of the right one Uˆ .
Then, the probability of not distinguishing this two trans-
formations after n measurements is
P = pn = en ln p. (14)
Since, for overwhelming majority of quantum networks,
the probability p is far less than one, a few measurements
are sufficient to realize that the network is erroneous.
As a result, we conclude that, to increase the security
of the cryptographic method, Alice and Bob should in-
crease not only the number of qubits but also the number
of quantum gates used.
IV. THE CASE OF A PRIORI KNOWN TIME
CORRELARIONS
Earlier, we supposed that Eve knew what information
was coded into the entangled states. Now we will assume
that she knows only time correlations between messages
of K classical bits. The correlations can be described by
the value
ξkl(y) = 〈pk(x)pl(x+ y)〉x, (15)
where pk(x) equals to unity, if x-th message is |k〉, and
zero otherwise.
We suppose that Eve possesses a priory information
such as the frequencies of appearance and the correlations
between K-bit messages that were sent by Alice. She
tries then to construct a quantum network that gives the
same frequencies and correlations.
The estimated value of intercepted messages necessary
for deduction of the unitary transformation is divided
into two parts: the number of trial unitary transfor-
mations and the number of necessary measurements for
each of them to understand whether the correlations are
proper or not. The first part of the problem is due to the
entanglement, and the second is the same to the case of
classical replacement cipher.
The number of trial unitary transformations is defined
by formula (12). For calculation of the correlations, it is
necessary to measure a number of quantum states that
is polynomial in the value 2K
Ncl ≈ Pn
(
2K
)
, (16)
where the power n of the polynomial Pn(x) corresponds
to taking into account of long time correlations.
The final number of messages to be intercepted is
Nnet ≈ Nquant ∗Ncl. (17)
V. DISCUSSION
In the suggested way of encoding information, the
number of messages that Eve must intercept is exponen-
tial in the number of qubits and quantum gates used.
This is clearly seen from equations (5), (12) and (17).
According to the obtained estimations, it is necessary
for Eve to derive the structure of all 2K entangled states,
that is, to intercept
N ≈ C × 22K (18)
messages. This corresponds to transmission of
Nbit ∼ K × 22K (19)
bits of classical information.
On the contrary, according to (12) it is necessary for
Alice and Bob to preset M numbers less than L to de-
fine the order of simple unitary transformations. As we
pointed earlier, M and K are of order K2, therefore, the
number of bits required for this is
Nkey ∼ K2 ∗ log2K2. (20)
This expression gives the length of the secret key that
must be shared by Alice and Bob. They can use a proto-
col of quantum key distribution to get it. Expression (19)
shows how many classical bits can be safely transmitted
using that secret key.
Let us estimate the length of time that Alice and Bob
may use a given unitary transformation without changing
it. For this, let us consider the enciphering of telephone
calls, which require transmission of about fifty thousand
bits per second. If the quantum computer operates with
K = 8 qubits, then according to our estimates, Eve
should intercept N ≈ 65 ∗ 103 messages, so Alice can
send about N ∗ K = 5 ∗ 105 classical bits or can talk
to Bob for ten seconds. If the computer operates with
K = 16 qubits, then the time of guessing of the unitary
transformation equals to several weeks. And in the case
ofK = 24 qubits the time of secure conversation for Alice
and Bob rises to four thousand years.
Although the suggested protocol requires a preset se-
cret key, it still has an advantage over classical block
cipher algorithms, which are also believed to be secure
4for transmission of an exponential number of bits in the
length of the key. The example of RSA system and Shor’s
algorithm shows that quantum mechanics can greatly
simplify the breaking of codes based on complexity of
classical algorithms. On the contrary, the safety of the
suggested protocol is assured by fundamental laws of na-
ture.
The main advantage of the suggested protocol is that
Alice and Bob, having arranged the secret transformation
once, can use it for a long time. The transmission is
carried out in one direction, as opposed to the protocols
of secret key distribution, which require repeated back-
and-forth transmissions from Alice to Bob.
It should be mentioned that, according to the section
IV, the problem of determination of the secret unitary
transformation is added to the classical cryptographic
problems. The main source of additional security is
the fact that the cloning of a state is forbidden in any
quantum-mechanical system [18]. Due to this theorem, a
measurement in a wrong basis may give less information
than in the classical case, where an intercepted message
can readily be used for correlations calculation. In the
quantum case, a part of intercepted entangled states will
be an inevitable distraction for determination of the se-
cret unitary transformation.
Another issue is that, according to the noncloning the-
orem [18], Eve destroys the quantum state measuring it
in a wrong basis, and, therefore, she is unable to send the
same state to Bob. In accordance with basic principles
of quantum cryptography [6], Bob can easily notice the
attempts of eavesdropping, and he can ask Alice to stop
the transmission. In another similarity to the case of rel-
ativistic quantum cryptography [19], Bob can detect the
attempted eavesdropping by the time delay for incoming
messages.
Although the considered protocol looks promising,
there are some problems in its realization. First, it ap-
pears that the construction of quantum computers han-
dling with tens of qubits is still a matter of the fu-
ture. Second, due to small decoherence times for the
systems with massive entangled particles, photons re-
main the best objects for transmission of quantum states,
but the conversion of a state of qubits into a state of
photons is a challenging problem for experimentalists.
Nevertheless, some efforts have been made to study cou-
pling between photons and qubits [20] and to convert
pairs of spin-entangled electrons to pairs of polarization-
entangled photons[21]. Finally, during the transmis-
sion of photons, there is the inevitable influence of the
medium on their states, and, therefore, the use of some
quantum error-correction techniques will be needed [22].
To conclude, we presented estimates showing that for
the suggested cryptographic protocol, the time that a
secure secret unitary transformation can be used is ex-
ponential in the number of qubits within the entangled
states and in the number of gates used to construct the
quantum network.
Although we can not at the moment present a rigorous
proof of the proper statements for Eve’s general attack,
the suggested protocol in our opinion can serve as an in-
teresting alternative to the existing schemes in quantum
cryptography. The main advantage of the cryptographic
protocol is that using even relatively small quantum com-
puters with several dozen qubits allows for a practical
scheme that is more efficient than existing ones in several
respects (e.g. weaker loading of communication channel).
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